Agency in Malpractice Cases: Funk v. Bohnam by Treanor, Walter E
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 3 | Issue 6 Article 4
3-1928
Agency in Malpractice Cases: Funk v. Bohnam
Walter E. Treanor
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Treanor, Walter E. (1928) "Agency in Malpractice Cases: Funk v. Bohnam," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 3: Iss. 6, Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol3/iss6/4
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
AGENCY IN MALPRACTICE CASES: Funk v. Bonham.
In an earlier comment in the Indiana Law Journal it was
stated that a surgeon "was not responsible for the negligence
of the nurses in incorrectly informing him that the sponges were
removed when he was operating in a public hospital which he
did not control, when the nurses were the employees of the hos-
pital, and when he employed the nurses and the operating room
in accordance with the regulations of the hospital."' The writer
of the present comment believes this statement is not in accord
with well established rules of agency and is not supported by
authority., The following comment is offered in support of the
writer's disagreement with the statement quoted above.
Various tests have been suggested by writers and courts for
the purpose of determining which of two or more persons shall
be considered the master of a particular servant in a given
transaction. Control has been emphasized especially as the
most significant test, some courts seeing in control the sole de-
termining and ultimate fact.2  Others have considered control
merely the significant factor in determining "whose is the work
being done," and have made this question the ultimate and
decisive test of the master-servant relation.3 Again it has been
insisted "that equally important with (1) control are the in-
quiries as to (2) who furnished the tools or mechanical devices
employed at the time the tort was committed (3) who had the
chance of profit, or (4) loss upon the enterprise in the course of
which the tort occurred." 4
In Schloendorff v. Society etc., the plaintiff sought to impute to
the hospital certain knowledge of a nurse respecting the opera-
tion performed upon the plaintiff. In rejecting this contention
the New York Court of Appeals said: 5
"The acts of preparation immediately preceding the operation are neces-
sary to its successful performance, and are really part of the operation
itself. They are not different in that respect from the administration of
the ether. Whatever the nurse does in these preliminary stages is done,
1 Evidence in Malpractice Cases: Funk v. Bonham, by Paul L. Sayre,
2 Ind. Law Jour., 484, at 486.
2Billig v. Southern Pao. Co. (1922) 189 Cal. 477, 209 Pac. 241.
3 Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson (1908) 212 U. S. 215, 220.
". . We must inquire whose is the work being performed, a question
which is usually answered by ascertaining who has the power to control
and to direct the servants in the performance of their work."
4 Powell's Tiffany on Agency §37. For distinctions between "general"
and "special" servant see Mechem on Agency, Vol. II, §§ 1860 and 1863.
5 (1914) 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92.
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not as the servant of the hospital, but in the course of the treatment of
the patient as the delegate of the surgeon to whose orders she is subject.
The hospital is not chargeable with her'knowledge that the operation is im-
proper any more than with the surgeon's."
In Hillyer v. The Governors of the St. Bartholomew's Hos-
pital6 the judges of the English Court of Appeals agreed that a
nurse, though a regular employee of the hospital, is the servant
of the surgeon while assisting at an operation. Farewell, L. J.,
pointed out that during an operation the nurse is "at the dis-
posal and under the sole orders of the operating surgeon .... ";
that "the surgeon is for the time supreme, and the defendants
cannot interfere with or gainsay his orders." He adds:
t
'This is well understood and is indeed essential to the success of the
operation; no surgeon would undertake the responsibility of operations if
his orders and directions were subject to the control of or interference by
the governing body. The nurses and carriers, therefore, assisting at an
operation cease for the time being to be the servants of the defendants,
inasmuch as they take their orders during that period from the operating
surgeon alone, and not from the hospital authorities."
In Spears v. McKinnon7 the plaintiff had suffered an injury as
a result of the assisting nurses' failure to remove sponges from
the abdomen of the plaintiff at the close of an operation per-
formed by the defendant. The lower court refused to admit
testimony relative to a custom in the hospital and among physi-
cians as to the conclusiveness of the count by attending nurses
of the number of sponges used in an operation. According to
the reviewing court "the theory of the appellants is that no
liability rested upon them as physicians and surgeons on account
of sponges or gauzes being left in the abdomen of appellee, be-
cause the duty of counting them, before and after the operation,
was imposed upon the attendant nurse, who was in the employ
of the hospital where the operation was performed." The court
rejected this theory, quoting the followings with approval:
"... Surgeons cannot relieve themselves from liability for injury to a
patient caused by leaving a sponge in the wound after an operation by an
adoption of the rule requiring the attending nurse to count the sponges
used and removed, and relying on such count as conclusive that all sponges
have been accounted for."
The facts of Funk v. Bonha 9 presented squarely to the In-
6 Court of Appeals (1909) 2 K. B. 820.
7 (1925) 270 S. W. 524.
8 21 R. C. L., p. 388, section 83.
9 (No. 1229, Appellate Court of Indiana, Mar. 10, 1926), 151 N. E. 22;
cited by Appellate Court in Hurst v. Reeder, 157 N. E. 101 and in McCoy v.
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diana Appellate Court the question whether the master-servant
relation exists between a surgeon who is operating on his patient
in a public hospital and the assisting nurses who are regular
employees of the hospital. As a result of the mistake of the
assisting nurses the "surgical sponge in question was left in
and sewed up in the abdomen of appellee by the appellant at the
time he performed said operation." This exact question had
not been considered by either the Supreme or Appellate Court of
Indiana, but both Courts have had occasion to state the test of
the existence of a master-servant relation in other situations.
The Supreme Court has said:10
"The real test is, Was the Appellee, at the time he sustained his injury,
under the power and control of appellant and subject to its orders and
directions in the doing of the work at hand?"
The Appellate Court has stated the test to be as follows:"
"The true test in such cases is to ascertain who directed the movement
of the person committing the injury. When one person lends a servant to
another for a particular employment, the servant for anything done in that
particular employment must be dealt with as the servant of the man to
whom he is lent, although he remains the general servant of the person who
lent him."
In disposing of the master-servant point in Funk v. Bonham
the Appellate Court does not cite any Indiana decision as au-
thority either on the facts or on principle; but does cite a Mas-
sachusetts decision' 2 and apparently relies on it as being on all
fours with the facts of Funk v. Bonham. In this connection the
court says:
"It has been expressly held that a surgeon who performs an operation
at a hospital, not owned and controlled by himself, and who is assisted in
such operation by nurses, not his employees, but employees of such hospital,
is not responsible for the mistake or negligence of such nurses in failing
to correctly count the sponges used in such operation, whereby a sponge is
left and sewed up in the body cavity of the patient, Baker v. Wentworth,
29 N. E. 589, 155 Mass. 338. The only question which therefore remains is
as to the personal negligence of the appellant herein."s
Buck, 157 N. E. 456 on a question of evidence, the later cases not involving
the agency question.
10 Marion Shoe co. v. Epley (1914) 181 Ind. 219, 104 N. E. 65.
11 Sargent Paint Co. v. Petrovitzky (1919) 71 Ind. App. 367, 124 N. E.
883, 885. See also Parkhurst v. Swift (1903) 31 Ind. App. 521, 68 N. 1R.
620.
12 Baker v. Wentworth (1892) 155 Mass. 338, 29 N. E. 589.
13 Funk v. Bonham, 151 N. E. 22, 24 (1926).
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The writer fails to find in the Massachusetts case sufficient
support for the Appellate Court's sweeping statement. The
particular acts constituting the alleged negligence do not appear
in the report. It is a fair inference from the statements of the
reviewing court that the claim against the surgeon was based
(1) on the surgeon's personal negligence and (2) on the negli-
gence of the nurses in their treatment of the patient after the
operation, it being sought to impute the latter negligence to
the surgeon as proprietor or manager of the hospital.
The following excerpts from the report of the Massachusetts
case support the above statements:
"The defendant set up in defense that the operations were not per-
formed nor his wife treated with proper care and skill, and also that the
nurses at the hospital where the operations were performed were negligent
and careless in their treatment of the defendant's wife."
"The only exceptions taken in this case relate to the admission of evi-
dence. One of the issue was whether the plaintiff was responsible for the
negligence of nurses in the hospital, where the defendant's wife was at-
tended after the surgical operations were performed upon her. As bearing
on this question it was competent to show that the plaintiff was not the
proprietor or manager of the hospital and that it was in charge of the
Sisterhood of St. Margaret ."
"It was immaterial that the defendant's wife supposed it to be the
plaintiff's private hospital inasmuch as neither the plaintiff nor any one
acting for him every made any representation to that effect."
In view of the past decisions of the Indiana Appellate and
Supreme Courts which have adopted "control" as the distinctive
and characteristic fact in the master-servant relation, and in
view of the very respectable authority which holds that the
master-servant relation exists between the operating surgeon
and the attending nurse furnished by the hospital, and in view
of the unsatisfactoriness of the one authority expressly relied
upon by the Court in Funk v. Bonham, the writer feels that the
members of the Indiana bar are entitled to a fuller and more
adequate consideration, by the Supreme or Appellate Court, of
the soundness of the agency doctrine announced in Funk v.
Bonham.
WALTER E. TREANOR.
Indiana University School of Law.
